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ABSTRACT
Utilities responsible for Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks must be able to
defend themselves from a variety of potential attacks so they may achieve the goals of deliver-
ing power to consumers and maintaining the integrity of their equipment and data. Intrusion
detection systems (IDSes) can play an important part in the defense of such networks. Util-
ities should carefully consider the strengths and weaknesses of different IDS deployment
strategies to choose the most cost-effective solution. Models of adversary behavior in the
presence of different IDS deployments can help with making this decision as we demonstrate
through a case study that uses a model created in the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation
(ADVISE) formalism (which calculates metrics used to compare different IDSes). We show
how these metrics give valuable insight into the selection of the appropriate IDS architecture
for an AMI network.
ii
To my family, for their love and support.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my adviser, Professor William H. Sanders, for his insight and support
of this project, and for giving me the opportunity to do research in the PERFORM group.
I would like to thank Ken Keefe for helping me to learn the Mo¨bius framework and the
ADVISE modeling formalism, and for assisting me in writing an early draft of this thesis. I
would also like to thank Dr. Brett Feddersen for the engaging discussions, encouragement and
technical advice. I also greatly appreciate the editorial assistance given by Jenny Applequist.
I am grateful for the advice and friendship of the members of the PERFORM group: Varun
Badrinath Krishna, Atul Bohara, Carmen Cheh, Ahmed Fawaz, Mohammad Noureddine,
Uttam Thakore, Benjamin Ujcich and Ronald Wright. I have learned a great deal from your
example.
I am especially grateful for my loving family. Thank you for always being there for me
and teaching me the most important things in life.
This thesis contains previously published material by M. Rausch, B. Feddersen, K. Keefe,
and W.H. Sanders [1]. The material from [1] was published in the Proceedings of the 13th
International Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST 2016). The final
publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43425-4 19
The work described here was performed, in part, with funding from the Department of
Homeland Security under contract HSHQDC-13-C-B0014, “Practical Metrics for Enterprise
Security Engineering.”
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Contributions and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER 2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 AMI Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 IDS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHAPTER 3 ADVISE OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 Attack Execution Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Adversary Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Reward Variable Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Solving the Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
CHAPTER 4 DESCRIPTION OF MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Attack Execution Graph Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Attacker Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3 Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CHAPTER 5 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1 Model Execution Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.1 An Argument for Quantitative Security Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Many utility companies are creating Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks,
which incorporate smart meters and other intelligent components into the power grid. The
added functionality allows utilities to monitor and control their smart grid more effectively.
The increased monitoring and control helps the utility respond to fluctuations in demand
for electricity, makes some classes of energy theft attacks more difficult to attempt, and
enables some new demand response schemes, to name a few benefits. Some estimate that
the smart grid will provide billions of dollars per year in added benefit compared to the
traditional electrical grid [2], while the United States International Trade Commission cites
market observers who predict the global smart meter market will rise from $4 billion in 2011
to about $20 billion in 2018 [3].
Unfortunately, AMI networks increase the attack surface of a power grid. For example,
an unscrupulous customer may compromise a single smart meter so that it sends false data
to under-report electricity consumption, resulting in a lower bill. These attacks have al-
ready occurred in various locations around the world, [4] [5], and prevention methods have
generated interest in the academic community [6] [7] [8].
Energy theft is not the only threat: utilities are also concerned about attacks that would
affect the integrity or availability of the grid. Distributed denial of service attacks, traffic
injection attacks, and Byzantine attacks are examples of new threats to these cyber-enhanced
power grids [9]. As utility companies build and maintain AMI infrastructures they should be
aware of the possibility of these attacks, and work to create a cost-efficient architecture to
minimize the expected damage. There could be catastrophic financial consequences if these
systems are not protected. Even relatively simple, low-tech attacks can be devastating, as
evidenced by the Metcalf sniper attack of 2013, which caused over $15 million in damage
[10]. According to a report by the insurance company Lloyd’s, a cyber-attack on the United
States grid could cost tens of billions of dollars in damage [11].
An effective approach to limiting the potential damage of an attack is to detect and
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respond to the attack before it can cause much harm. An intrusion detection system (IDS)
can help a utility company detect an attack on their cyber-enhanced networks. There are
several different IDS architectures that can be deployed by a utility company as a defensive
precaution [12]. Each architecture has a different cost and degree of effectiveness. A utility
company must decide whether its application warrants an IDS, and if so, which would give
the best protection for the best price. Making the correct decision is vital.
One common way to approach this problem is to hire security experts and have them
collaborate with the system engineers to develop an appropriate security architecture. This
is a good start, but the approach suffers from three limitations:
• First, assumptions of the various collaborating experts are often not made explicit. The
experts may have different backgrounds, different ways of approaching the problem,
and different implicit assumptions. It is necessary to have some mechanism or common
language that is intuitive and easy to use to help make these assumptions explicit to
facilitate communicate between the domain experts and the security experts.
• Second, decisions made using this approach are not easily auditable. If the decisions
are not auditable, it will be impossible for an independent outside expert to validate
whether they are correct. Even if the security expert charged with conducting the
initial risk assessment is infallible, it would be useful to have a record of the expert’s
decision making process when he or she is no longer employed, so others may make an
equally good decision when conditions in the system change.
• Finally, this approach relies heavily on the intuition and experience of the experts
involved in the process. Architects in other domains (e.g. civil engineering projects)
do not have to rely solely on intuition and experience. Instead, their intuition and
experience is verified and complemented by science-based mathematical models. We
should similarly work towards a science of security [13].
One approach for informing this critical design decision is to build a sound, state-based
stochastic model of the system and the possible IDS architectures that can be applied to
it. Quantitative metrics can be calculated on the models to determine which configuration
provides the best cost/security balance. This thesis presents one such approach in the form
a model created using the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) formalism [14].
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1.2 Related Work
The academic community, recognizing the importance of the topic, has done prior work
comparing different security approaches in AMI, many examples of which can be found in
the survey by Wang and Lu [15]. In this section we shall highlight some of the most relevant
and interesting results.
The analysis in [16] proposes a method to determine the utility of adding expensive radio-
frequency identification (RFID) technology to help discourage electricity theft. The authors
construct a cost model which incorporates the number of new components required for the
RFID scheme, and the price of each component, including installation and shipping costs.
The authors also construct a benefit model which incorporates the difference in electricity
stolen with and without the RFID technology. The cost model and the benefit model are
then combined to create a cost-benefit model which allows a utility to calculate whether it
makes financial sense to add the RFID technology. The paper does not consider integrity or
availability attacks, but instead limits its scope to energy theft. In this thesis we also compare
costs and benefits, but we use a stochastic modeling technique, and consider integrity and
availability attacks.
The techniques proposed in [17] seek to compare and evaluate the security of different
AMI IDSes. The authors use two special types of attack trees to guide penetration testing.
An archetypal attack tree is generic and vendor-independent, while a concrete attack tree
is vendor-specific. The authors realized that attack trees for similar systems composed of
components from different vendors had many similarities, but also important differences.
The use of archetypal and concrete attack trees allows one archetypal attack tree describing
the commonalities to be created and reused for several systems, and the concrete attack tree
could be grafted to the archetypal attack tree to specify vendor-specific differences. Once
the modeler creates these attack trees they may be used to enable penetration testing to
evaluate proposed systems. The authors focus on energy fraud, denial of service, and targeted
disconnect attacks. These attack trees could help a modeler create an attack execution graph
in an ADVISE model. In contrast to this thesis, their paper does not explicitly model the
attacker’s attributes or motivations in detail.
The authors of [12] provide a framework for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of different
IDS architectures in an AMI network. Their framework incorporates the installation and
maintenance costs of the intrusion detection system, the effectiveness of the intrusion de-
tection system, how densely the smart meters are deployed, and several other factors to
develop a model. However, the approach outlined in the paper does not explicitly account
for the differences in the behaviors of adversaries when attacking the system, and considers
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attacks at a very high level. In this thesis, we build upon the framework, but extend it by
incorporating the adversary behavior into the model, along with a lower-level view of the
attacks. We believe that the resulting model is more realistic and provides results that are
more useful to those who must make security decisions.
1.3 Contributions and Organization
This thesis presents a modeling approach a utility may utilize to make sound, auditable, and
informed design decisions to help secure AMI deployments with a cost-effective intrusion
detection system. The metrics generated by our executed models provide rich insight into
the system, adversaries that may confront the system, and the interactions between the
system and the adversaries. We use an extensive case study to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the approach.
We offer a multi-layered power grid example and the potential IDS implementations that
can be applied to this grid. We consider three different IDS deployment strategies — cen-
tralized, dedicated, and embedded — to determine the most cost effective approach the
utility may take. We then review the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) [14]
formalism, and introduce a new adversary decision algorithm, which has been implemented
in the Mo¨bius modeling tool [18].
We demonstrate how the formalism may be used to construct a model of attacks that
may be attempted against the power grid we previously defined. We use the same formalism
to construct models of several different types of adversary — insider, malicious customer,
nation state, and terrorist — that may be a threat to the utility company. We then show
how the attack models and the adversary models may be composed to explore interactions
between the system and the adversaries.
We show how to define a variety of metrics that may be calculated using the ADVISE
model we construct. Using these metrics, a utility company can make a more informed
decision about how to implement an IDS on its grid. Given a particular intrusion detection
deployment approach and adversary, the metrics generated by the modeling approach may
be used to estimate the probability of detecting the adversary, the sequence of attack steps
taken by the adversary to reach a goal, the cost to the adversary to achieve their goal,
and, perhaps most importantly, the damage done to the utility due to the activity of the
adversary.
However, the most important contribution is the end-to-end demonstration of a modeling
method for comparing the relative security-related strengths and weaknesses of an AMI
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deployment. A model that gives quantitative security metrics will give a system designer
another technique to complement the advice and intuition of security experts, and moves us
closer to the goal of developing a science of security.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background on
AMI networks and intrusion detection systems, and presents the example power grid that we
use in our case study. Chapter 3 gives a review of the ADVISE formalism, and describes the
various submodels which compose an ADVISE model, including the attack model, adversary
models, and metric models. It also describes how an ADVISE model is executed to calculate
the metrics of interest. Chapter 4 offers a detailed explanation of the ADVISE model that
was constructed, including the adversary profiles that were considered and the metrics that
were defined on the system. Chapter 5 shows our quantitative results and our interpretation
of them. It also presents a thorough sensitivity analysis, to explore to what degree the model
results change with different input parameters. Finally, Chapter 6 provides future directions
and concludes the work.
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CHAPTER 2
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
2.1 AMI Overview
A utility company may benefit from an AMI deployment in a number of different ways. An
AMI deployment enables remote meter readings, and some deployments allow the utility
to remotely connect and disconnect a consumer’s smart meter. Both of these features may
reduce the need for expensive truck rolls which had previously been necessary to accomplish
these tasks [19]. An AMI deployment enables more frequent meter readings, which may help
an AMI learn to anticipate changes in consumer demand for electricity and to increase or
decrease generation to properly meet electricity demand. Additionally, an AMI deployment
may make it easier to detect certain classes of electricity theft attacks [20].
An AMI deployment also enables some forms of demand response that otherwise would
have been difficult or impossible to implement [21]. The rate of electricity consumption is not
constant. Occasionally there will be periods of relatively high demand. For example, there is
likely to be high demand at 1 pm on a hot summer day when many consumers will be running
air conditioning units at the same time. A utility that does not respond appropriately to
periods of increased demand elevates the risk of brownouts or even blackouts. Traditionally,
utilities could only effectively respond to increased demand by increasing supply by bringing
additional generators online, which is expensive. However, demand response enabled by AMI
deployments may, in real-time or close to real-time, increase the cost of electricity during
times of high demand in an attempt to suppress some of the demand. In this way, demand
response complements supply response, in theory limiting the number of generators that
need to be brought online to meet the increased demand and saving the utility money.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure deployments offer many clear benefits to utility compa-
nies by reducing operational costs and giving the utilities greater control of their networks,
which has led many utilities to upgrade their existing grids or deploy new smart grids. There
are two main deployment strategies to enable connectivity between the smart meter and the
utility’s command and control center: a utility may either choose to use a commercial In-
ternet connection, or build and use their own network. For example, a utility may install a
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Figure 2.1: Advanced Metering Infrastructure system diagram.
smart meter in the consumer’s home and communicate with it through the consumer’s In-
ternet connection, or a commercial cellular network or commercial cable network. However,
some utilities prefer to use their own networks to establish the connectivity between the
smart meter and the utility. The utility may choose to use their own networks so they have
greater control over the network (because they may have heightened security, availability,
or integrity requirements), or because the area the consumer lives in may not provide any
convenient preexisting networks that a utility can leverage.
In our case study we consider a hypothetical utility which uses its own network infras-
tructure. We choose to only study deployments utilizing the utility company’s own network,
because we focus on AMI network defense from the perspective of the utility company. If the
utility does not own and operate the network they are not likely to have much influence on
how it is defended, and the problem becomes one of defending a general-purpose connectivity
infrastructure, which is outside the scope of this thesis.
The network architecture of the AMI considered in this case study is shown in Figure 2.1.
This network architecture and its variants are commonly used, and is similar to the system
described in [12] and [22].
At the bottom level of the hierarchy, a smart meter forms the core of a home area network
(HAN). The HAN may include other smart appliances, in addition to the smart meter. An
example may be a charging station for an electric car which is programmed to respond to
commands from the smart meter to recharge the car during times of low demand, and to
cease charging during times of high demand [23]. If there are multiple devices in the HAN,
the smart meter itself may act as a network gateway for the other devices.
Multiple HANs may be connected with each other and one or more data concentrator
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units (DCUs) to form a neighborhood area network (NAN). A DCU serves as a gateway for
the NAN, collecting readings from a number of meters and forwarding it to the utility, or
relaying commands from the utility control center to the smart meters. The NANs do not
require high bandwidth or long range, and can use shorter-range wireless. We assume in our
case study that the NAN uses a wireless mesh network.
The wide area network (WAN) keeps the various NANs connected to the utility’s control
center, enabling the communication between the DCUs and the utility. The WAN usually uti-
lizes higher bandwidth, long-range communication technologies such as long-range wireless,
satellite, or power line communication. We make no assumptions about what communication
technology the utility uses in the WAN.
We limit the scope of the case study to attacks on the electric distribution system, and do
not consider attacks on the generation or transmission of electricity.
2.2 IDS Overview
Intrusion detection systems are intended to monitor a system for suspicious activity, to
raise an alert if a security event occurs, and to log information to determine how an attack
proceeded through the system. A number of different IDS deployment strategies are possible
in an AMI. In this thesis, we consider centralized IDSes, dedicated distributed IDSes, and
embedded distributed IDSes. These options are shown in Figure 2.2.
A centralized IDS deployment scheme would place an IDS at the top of the network
hierarchy, in the utility company’s network. The IDS would monitor all traffic flowing into
and out of the utility company’s command and control center LAN network, and raise an
alert if it detected anything suspicious. However, it would be completely unaware of inter-
meter traffic, since that would not pass through the top level of the hierarchy. This is a
significant limitation. As a result, the IDS may miss evidence of an adversary’s presence
spreading through the smart meters in a NAN until it is too late to prevent an attack.
Alternatively, a utility could deploy a distributed set of IDSes to monitor inter-meter com-
munication. This approach would still require a central node to coordinate the monitoring,
so it would have many of the benefits of a centralized IDS approach, along with the added
benefit of inter-meter traffic monitoring. Unfortunately, this approach would incur increased
installation and maintenance costs associated with the additional IDSes. We consider two
main distributed IDS variants: dedicated and embedded.
A dedicated IDS deployment would have the same components as a centralized deployment,
and in addition it would have a number of geographically distributed dedicated IDS devices
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Figure 2.2: An AMI network with different intrusion detection system deployment options
displayed. The location of the IDSes are denoted by stars. The solid black star denotes the
location of the centralized IDS, while the location of the dedicated and embedded IDSes
are denoted by checkered and striped stars, respectively.
in wireless communication with the smart meters. These IDSes would monitor AMI traffic
within wireless range in an effort to detect malicious and anomalous network behavior.
An embedded IDS deployment incorporates intrusion detection directly into the smart
meter. Like the dedicated IDS architecture, the embedded IDSes communicate and cooperate
with the central IDS device.
There are a number of trade-offs to consider when evaluating these IDS designs. A central-
ized IDS would potentially miss large families of attacks because it is unaware of inter-meter
communication. It is, however, the cheapest IDS option. An embedded or dedicated IDS
scheme would be able to observe inter-meter communication, possibly allowing it to detect
a larger set of attacks than a centralized scheme, but would cost more.
A dedicated architecture would cost more because many additional devices would have to
be purchased and maintained, and installation would require separate permits and location
sites. Technicians would require additional training to install and maintain the devices.
However, the device would be able to monitor inter-meter communication in the NAN. One
dedicated device could serve multiple smart meters, which could be especially advantageous
in an urban setting with a dense deployment of smart meters.
An embedded system would not require separate building sites or permits, but every single
meter would cost slightly more because of the added IDS capability. Given the large number
of meters involved, even a small increase in price for an individual meter would potentially
be very costly for a utility company. Smart meters may need to obey regulations about how
9
much power they can consume, and smart meters often have limited computing capabilities,
which restrains the power of the IDS that may be installed. However, no new installation
sites or permits would be required, and technicians would only have to be trained to install
and maintain one type of device, in contrast with the distributed architecture. In addition
to monitoring inter-meter communication, an embedded IDS architecture would be able to
detect attacks on the meter itself, which is a capability the other IDSes we consider may not
have. This means the embedded IDS option provides the greatest coverage against possible
attacks among the IDSes we consider.
We do not claim that these are the only IDS deployment strategies available, and a utility
could choose to use some combination of them. However, we have chosen to do an in-depth
analysis of these three options, rather than a shallower analysis of more options. A utility
interested in other IDS deployment strategies could evaluate them easily by extending the
ADVISE models developed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
ADVISE OVERVIEW
The ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) method [14] is used to calculate quan-
titative security metrics via executable models of adversary behavior in a system [24]. At
a high level, a modeler first creates an Attack Execution Graph (AEG), and defines an ad-
versary profile. The AEG is similar to a standard attack tree [25], however, it incorporates
additional details about each attack’s properties (e.g. cost, time to completion, probability
of success, etc.), and contains nodes that track the state of the model. The adversary profile
expresses an adversary’s initial capabilities to access different subsystems, knowledge rele-
vant to accomplishing an attack, or skill in various techniques. It also defines the adversary’s
motivations, and to what degree the adversary values various goals. The AEG and adversary
profile are then combined together with a model of the metrics of interest. This combined
model is then executed to calculate the metrics. These metrics may then be used by a
modeler to help make security-relevant design decisions. In our case, the metrics will help
a security analyst determine the most cost-effective intrusion detection system architecture
for an Advanced Metering Infrastructure deployment.
3.1 Attack Execution Graphs
An AEG, originally described in [14], is defined by the tuple
< A,R,K, S,G,C >
where A is the set of attack steps, R is the set of access domains available to the adversary, K
is the set of information that can be known by the adversary, S is the set of skills possessed
by the adversary, and G is the set of goals that the adversary attempts to achieve. The
relation C defines the set of directed connecting arcs from e ∈ R∪K∪S∪G to a ∈ A, where
e is a prerequisite element needed in order to attempt a. This relation also defines the set of
directed connecting arcs from a ∈ A to e ∈ R∪K∪S∪G, where e is an affected element that
may be changed by the performance of a. The elements R,K, S, and G are state variables
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Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of elements in an Attack Execution Graph.
that hold an integer value that usually represents whether the element represented by the
state variable has been obtained (1 or 0).
An attack step, originally described in [14], is defined by the tuple
< B, T, C,O >
where B is a Boolean precondition that indicates whether or not the attack step is currently
enabled, T is the timing distribution that is sampled to determine the time it takes to
complete the attack step, C is the cost to the adversary for attempting the attack, and O is
the set of outcomes of the attack (such as success or failure). Each outcome contains a Pr,
D, and E, which are the probability the outcome will be selected from an attack step’s O,
the probability of being detected for that outcome, and the effect of that outcome on the
state of the model, respectively. An adversary uses the solution of a competitive Markov
decision process [26] as described in [14] to select the best attack step given the adversary’s
characteristics, abilities and preferences.
In Mo¨bius AEGs are represented graphically, as seen in Figure 3.1, according to the follow-
ing convention: attack steps are represented by yellow rectangles, goals state variables are
represented by orange ovals, access state variables are represented by red squares, skill state
variables are represented by blue triangles, and knowledge state variables are represented by
green circles.
3.2 Adversary Profile
The adversary profile defines the initial starting position and attributes of the adversary,
how the adversary makes decisions, and what motivates the adversary to act. Specifically,
there are three components to the adversary profile, (1) the description of the initial state of
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the model, which defines the attacker’s initial foothold in the system, the skills the attacker
possesses, and the knowledge with which the attacker starts, (2) the adversary decision
algorithm, which the attacker uses to select the next attack step to attempt, and (3) the
goal assignment function, which assigns the payoff the attacker receives for holding goals.
Adversaries may have different characteristics, which may lead to different behavior. To
express the differences in characteristics, the ADVISE formalism requires an adversary pro-
file, in addition to the Attack Execution Graph described previously.
An adversary profile, described in [14], is formally defined by the tuple
< s0, V, UC , UP , UD, N >
where s0 is the initial state of the model, V is the attack goal value function, UC , UP , and
UD are the preference weights for avoiding cost, obtaining payoff, and avoiding detection,
respectively, and N is the planning horizon (the maximum number of steps into the future
that may be considered) for the adversary.
The initial state of the model, s0, defines the initial value of every access, skill, knowledge
and goal state variable in the model. The attack goal value function, V , assigns a payoff for
achieving a goal for every goal in the model. An adversary may not be equally interested in
achieving every goal in the model, but rather prefer some goals to others. This idea may be
precisely expressed in the adversary profile via the attack goal value function.
3.2.1 Adversary Decision Algorithm
According to LeMay [14], the adversary selects the best attack step given the state using a
stationary deterministic Markovian decision rule [26],
βN(s) = arg max
ai∈As
{attrN(ai, s)},
where s is the state, As is the set of actions that the adversary may attempt given state s,
and N is the planning horizon. The attractiveness function attr returns a value representing
the expected value of the attack ai given s. Different definitions of attr are possible.
The case studies in [14] used the following definition for attr:
attrN(ai, s) = wC · UC(CNi (s)) + wP · UP (PNi (s)) + wD · UD(DNi (s)).
The attack preference weights, wC , wP , and wD, define the adversary’s preference for avoiding
cost, gaining payoff, and avoiding detection, respectively, and wC +wP +wD = 1. The utility
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functions for cost, payoff, and detection are UC(·), UP (·), and UD(·), respectively. Finally,
CNi , P
N
i , and D
N
i are the recursively computed expected path cost, expected path payoff,
and expected path detection, respectively.
LeMay defined a function to convert cost units, c, given on a [0-100] scale, to utility units
on a [0-1] scale:
UC(c) =

1, when c < 0,
e2−e(c/50)
e2−1 , when 0 ≤ c ≤ 100,
0, when c < 100.
Similarly, she constructed a function to convert payoff units, p, given on a [0-1000] scale, to
utility units on a [0-1] scale:
UP (p) =

0, when p < 0,
e10/3− e10/3
ep/300
e10/3−1 , when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1000,
1, when p < 1000.
More simply, she also defined a function to convert detection probabilities, d, given on a [0-1]
scale, to utility units on a [0-1] scale:
UD(d) =
1− e2
e2d
1− e2 .
We found it challenging to use these conversion functions. Ensuring that the costs and
payoffs would not exceed the their respective ranges of [0-100] and [0-1000] was difficult,
especially when long planning horizons were used. Furthermore, since our model defines
costs and payoffs in terms of dollars, using this definition would have required us to define
additional functions to convert cost in dollars to cost units in a [0-100] range, and payoff
in dollars to payoff units in a [0-1000] range. The exponential nature of the functions also
frequently led to unintuitive results and behavior.
For this case study, we used a simplified definition of the attractiveness function attr,
based on the concept of expected net profit. We defined attr to be
attrN(ai, s) = −Cost(ai) +
∑
t∈Outcomes(ai)
Pr(t)(Payoff(t)− PrDetect(t) ∗DetectionCost),
where Cost(a) is a function that returns the expected cost the adversary incurs for attempting
a, Outcomes(a) is a function that returns the set of outcomes of a, Pr(t) is a function that
returns the probability that outcome t will be randomly selected if the adversary selects
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a, Payoff(t) returns the payoff for the adversary if the outcome occurs, PrDetect(t) is a
function that returns the probability of detection if the outcome occurs, and DetectionCost
is a constant that defines the cost the adversary incurs when detected by the defender.
This net-profit definition of the attractiveness function, which we use for all of the adver-
saries in this thesis, has a number of benefits. Since we are not converting cost and payoff
values into utility values on a [0-1] range, we do not need to use the non-intuitive and com-
plicated exponential functions. As a result, we do not need to set a lower or upper bound
on the values the cost and payoff values may take, and it allows us to simply define one unit
of payoff or one unit of cost to be equal to one dollar. These benefits greatly simplify the
modeling process.
3.3 Reward Variable Model
Theoretically, ADVISE supports more than one kind of reward model for expressing metrics.
However, in this case study, metrics are defined using rate- and event-based performance
variables [27]. Possible metrics include:
• Accumulated Adversary Payoff
The total payoff for the model being in its current state from the point of view of the
adversary at a specific discrete time point.
• Average Number of Attempts at Specific Attack Step
The mean number of times an attack step is attempted in a specific time interval.
• Cost to Adversary
The total cost accumulated by the adversary for its behavior in the model.
• Number of Goals Achieved
The number of goals held by an adversary at a specific discrete point of time.
• Probability State Variable Held by Adversary
The probability a particular ADVISE state variable (access, skill, knowledge, or goal)
is held by the adversary at a specific discrete time point.
• Probability of Detecting Adversary
The probability that the adversary will be detected sometime in a specific time interval.
• Specific Attack Step Outcome Rate
The number of times a particular outcome occurs during a specific interval of time.
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• Total Damage Caused by Adversary
The total damage from the perspective of the defender in the current state of the model
at a discrete time point.
• Value of Access, Knowledge, Skill or Goal State Variable
The number held by a particular ADVISE state variable at a specific discrete time
point.
This is not an exhaustive list of possible metrics. Indeed, the performance variable model
gives a modeler the power and flexibility to create custom metrics tailored to their specific
use case. We describe the particular metrics we use in this case study in Chapter 4.
3.4 Solving the Models
The ADVISE model, once defined, may be executed to calculate the defined metrics. An
executable ADVISE model consists of the initial model state and the functions that may
change the model state. There are two primary classes of these functions: the adversary
attack decision function (which we have described previously), and the attack outcome se-
lection functions.
The adversary attack decision function takes the set of all attack steps and the current
model state as input and returns an attack step, the attack step that the adversary will
attempt next. The adversary attack decision function first determines all of the attacks for
which the precondition expression is true, as these are the only attacks that an adversary
may choose to attempt. Then the function calculates the attractiveness of each of these
remaining attack steps, and selects the most attractive attack step given the model state.
Once the adversary decides upon a particular attack step one of the outcomes of the attack
step is randomly selected according to the probabilities associated with each outcome of that
attack step, and the effect of the outcome is applied to the model state. Then the process
starts over from the beginning. The most attractive attack for the adversary given the new
model state is found, one of the outcomes of the attack is randomly selected, the model
state is updated. This cycle repeats until the simulation ends. This hybrid of game theory
and simulation is used to calculate the security metrics of interest, which may be used by
security analysts to help make informed design decisions.
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CHAPTER 4
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL
In this case study, we consider a hypothetical utility company with an urban deployment
of an AMI network, as shown in Figure 2.1 and described in Chapter 2. We have based
our system on the system described in [12], following it in detail whenever possible. In this
network, zero or more smart appliances connect to a smart meter at each home and together
form a HAN. Multiple HANs are connected to one another and one or more gateways via a
wireless mesh network to form a NAN. Multiple NANs are connected to one another and to
the utility command and control center network via a WAN.
The utility wishes to supply power to consumers, protect their equipment, ensure the
integrity of communication in the AMI network, and ensure the confidentiality of communi-
cation in the AMI network.
The utility company in this scenario wishes to analyze four classes of potential adversaries:
disgruntled insider employees who wish to cause as much monetary damage as possible in
retribution for a perceived wrong, unscrupulous customers who wish to under-report their
electricity consumption to unfairly lower their bill, sophisticated, well-funded nation-states
who wish to interrupt the delivery of power and cause as much damage as possible, and
terrorists who wish to gain notoriety for their cause by publicly compromising the availability
and integrity of the power grid.
An adversary may choose from a variety of attacks to achieve a goal. We utilized the
literature search conducted in [9] to compile a list of attacks for inclusion in our model. An
adversary may install a node to jam the wireless communication in the NAN or perform
various routing attacks. Alternatively, the adversary may choose to compromise one or more
smart meters either by physical means (such as an optical port compromise) or through
a remote compromise (possibly through a compromised device in the HAN that is also
connected to the Internet) to gain control of the component(s). Once compromised, these
device(s) can be used to launch Byzantine attacks, black-hole attacks, denial of service
attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and other attacks. In addition, an attacker may choose
to take physical rather than cyber action.
The utility company wishes to compare the cost-effectiveness of various proposed IDS
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Label Attack Step Name
1 Install Long Range Jammer
2 Install Short Range Jammer
3 Install Malicious Smart Meter
4 Physical Smart Meter Exploit
5 Mass Meter Compromise
6 Remote Smart Meter Exploit
7 Collect Crypto Keys
8 Create Botnet
9 Analyze Traffic
10 Gain Routing Capability
11 Major Jamming Attack
12 Minor Jamming Attack
13 Physical Attack
14 Minor Routing Attack
15 Major Routing Attack
16 Byzantine Attack
17 Resource Exhaustion Attack
Table 4.1: Attack step labels and their corresponding names from Figure 4.1.
architectures. In particular it wishes to compare the centralized IDS solution with the
two distributed IDS solutions: embedded and dedicated. The utility can easily obtain the
estimated installation and maintenance costs of an IDS from vendors. However, estimating
the expected benefit of implementing the IDS is much more difficult. We attempt to make
such an estimate with an ADVISE model.
We used the ADVISE formalism as implemented in Mo¨bius to create a model that was
detailed enough to calculate the quantitative security metrics of interest, while minimizing
the number of assumptions that a more detailed model would have forced us to make. We
were primarily interested in four key model results: the attack path used by the adversary,
the average cost the adversary incurs while attacking the system, the estimated probability
of detecting an adversary, and the estimated damage to the utility company due to adversary
behavior.
4.1 Attack Execution Graph Model
The attack execution graph, which is shown in Figure 4.1, contains three main adversary
goals; three auxiliary goals; seventeen attack steps that an adversary may attempt when
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Figure 4.1: Attack Execution Graph of ADVISE Model. The names associated with each
attack step label can be found in Table 4.1, and the names associated with each state
variable can be found in Table 4.2.
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Label State Variable Name
A Undetected Goal
B Node Installation Skill
C Physical Access
D Smart Meter Installation Skill
E Physical Smart Meter Exploit Skill
F Remote Smart Meter Exploit Skill
G Botnet Shepherd Skill
H Compromised Smart Meters
I Traffic Analysis Skill
J Crypto Keys
K Traffic Knowledge
L Long Range Jammer Access
M Short Range Jammer Access
N Routing Attack Skill
O Routing Capability
P Byzantine Attack Skill
Q Botnet Access
R Steal Energy Goal
S Interrupt Service Goal
T Damage Equipment Goal
U Goal Achieved
Table 4.2: State variable labels and their corresponding names from Figure 4.1.
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trying to reach a goal; a number of supporting access, knowledge, and skill state variables
that may help an adversary satisfy the preconditions for attempting a particular attack; and
arcs that connect the attack steps to particular accesses, knowledge, skills, and goals and
signify the relationships between them. The access, skill, knowledge, and goal state variables
in our model hold a value of zero if they are not held by the adversary, and a positive integer
otherwise.
The set of goals desired by the adversary drives his or her behavior and are therefore one
of the most important components of the model. Cheating the company by under-reporting
electricity consumption, interrupting the delivery of electric power, and damaging the util-
ity’s equipment are the three most important adversary goals. Those goals are represented
in Figure 4.1 by Goals R, S, and T, respectively. In addition, the adversary wishes to re-
main undetected; this goal is represented by Goal A, the Undetected goal. Goal H is the
supporting goal of acquiring compromised smart meters. Finally, Goal U represents the
goal of achieving at least one of the three primary goals described previously. Usually goal
state variables initially hold a value of zero; and the value is incremented on the successful
conclusion of an attack. The notable exception is the Undetected goal, which initially holds
a value of 1 and is decremented to 0 if an attack fails and the adversary is detected.
In the model, the adversary is not allowed to attack after being detected. For this reason,
every attack step in the graph is connected by an arc to the Undetected goal, which is a
prerequisite that must be satisfied before attempting any attack step. If the Undetected goal
holds a value of zero, the adversary may not attempt any attack, with the exception of the
unique DoNothing attack step [14].
Attack steps can be attempted by an adversary either to achieve a goal directly or to
change the model state to make it easier to achieve a goal later. An attack step must have
at least one outcome. In this particular ADVISE model every attack step outcome results
either in the certain detection of an adversary, or the adversary remaining undetected. In
other words, if po is the probability of detection associated with an outcome o, then po = 0
or po = 1, but po /∈ (0, 1).
Attack Step 1 in the AEG diagram is an Install Long Range Jammer Attack. This attack
step requires the adversary to be undetected, to be in reasonably close proximity to the smart
meters, and to have skill in installing wireless jammers. It would result in the adversary’s
having access to a long-range wireless jammer that incapacitates the wireless mesh network in
the NAN. The adversary must hold several prerequisites to attempt this attack, including the
NodeInstallationSkill, represented by Skill B, the PhysicalSmartMeterAccess, represented by
Access C, and the Undetected goal. At the successful conclusion of the attack, the adversary
gains the LongRangeJammerAccess, Access L, whose value is incremented from 0 to 1. Attack
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Step 2, Install Short Range Jammer, is very similar, but its purpose is to gain access to a
short-range wireless jammer that blocks communication in a HAN rather than a NAN, so
Attack 2 is connected to ShortRangeJammerAccess, Access M. Attack 2’s prerequisites are
identical to Attack 1’s prerequisites.
Any one of Attack Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 may be attempted by an adversary in an effort to
obtain the NumCompromisedSmartMeters goal (Goal H), which would give the adversary
control of smart meters in the AMI network. Attack Step 3, InstallMaliciousSmartMeter,
aims to accomplish this goal by installing a new meter (controlled by the adversary) that
tricks the AMI network into accepting it as one of its own smart meters. Attack Step 3
requires physical access to the AMI network and skill in installation as prerequisites, and so
is connected to the PhysicalAccess access and the SmartMeterInstallationSkill skill, shown
as Access C and Skill D, respectively. Attack Step 4, PhysicalSmartMeterExploit, represents
an adversary attempt to physically tamper with the smart meter to gain control of it. An
adversary must have physical access to the smart meters and skill in this exploit to attempt
the attack step, so Attack Step 4 is connected to Access C and Skill E, which are the
PhysicalAccess access and the PhysicalSmartMeterExploitSkill skill, respectively. Attack
Step 5, MassMeterCompromise, is very similar to Attack Step 4, with the major difference
being that 50 smart meters are compromised if this attack step is achieved instead of just
one. Finally, Attack Step 6 also compromises 50 smart meters, but it requires the adversary
to have the appropriate skill (RemoteSmartMeterExploitSkill, shown as Skill F) and does
not require the adversary to have physical access to the smart meters or other power grid
components.
Attack Steps 7, 9, and 10 are related because their sequence leads to Access O, the
RoutingCapability access, which is a prerequisite for Attack Steps 14, 15, and 16. Attack
Step 7, CollectCryptoKeys, represents the adversary’s attempt to collect cryptographic keys
from the compromised smart meters. The adversary must have access to compromised smart
meters to attempt the attack, and if the attack step is successful, it leads to the acquisition
of knowledge of the cryptographic keys, which is represented by Knowledge Item J. The
AnalyzeTraffic attack step (Attack Step 9) requires the adversary to hold Knowledge Item J
and Skill I (I being the TrafficAnalysis skill) in order to attempt the attack step. If successful,
the adversary gains sufficient knowledge of the traffic in the network to launch sophisticated
routing and Byzantine attacks. This knowledge is represented by the TrafficKnowledge
state variable, which is Knowledge Item K. Finally, the adversary may attempt Attack Step
10, GainRoutingCapability, if he or she has knowledge of the keys and traffic and at least
one compromised smart meter. If the prerequisites have been satisfied, the adversary will
successfully execute the attack step and gain the RoutingCapability access.
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Attack Step 8, CreateBotnet, gives the adversary the BotnetAccess access, depicted as
Access Q, which is a prerequisite for launching resource exhaustion attacks such as DDoS
attacks. To attempt the attack step, the adversary must hold Skill G, the BotnetShepherd
skill, as well as at least 50 smart meters, represented by a value greater than or equal to 50
in Goal H.
There are seven attack steps that directly achieve at least one of the three most signifi-
cant goals (Attacks 11-17). First, Attack Step 11, the Major Jamming Attack, requires the
adversary to have access to a long range jammer; it results in a significant interruption of
service in the NAN, and also damages equipment, since important commands for coordi-
nating the network are not delivered. Attack Step 12, which is the Minor Jamming Attack,
requires access to a short-range jammer: it does not result in loss of power or damage to
equipment but may be utilized to help an unscrupulous customer give a false power reading
to under-report electricity consumption. Attack Step 13, PhysicalAttack, represents a major
physical, non-cyber attack on the equipment of the utility company. This attack requires
only physical access to the equipment, and causes a significant blackout and major damage
to the equipment. It has a relatively high probability of detection, but requires only minimal
prerequisites to attempt. Attack Steps 14 and 15, MinorRoutingAttack and MajorRoutin-
gAttack, respectively, are similar in that they have the same prerequisites, RoutingAttack
skill and RoutingCapability access (Skill N and Access O, respectively), but have different
intended goals. The MinorRoutingAttack under-reports the electricity consumption of one
customer. The MajorRoutingAttack, in contrast, leads to interrupted service and damage
to the AMI network equipment. Attack Step 16, ByzantineAttack, requires that the adver-
sary hold the RoutingCapability access and the ByzantineAttack skill (Access O and Skill
P, respectively), and a successful outcome for the adversary leads to damaged equipment
and interrupted service. Finally, Attack Step 17, the ResourceExhaustion attack, requires
BotnetAccess and results in damaged equipment and interrupted service.
In addition, there is one attack step not shown in the diagram, the DoNothing attack
step, which an adversary may attempt at any time and has no effect on the model state,
costs nothing, and will never lead to the detection of the adversary. This attack step may be
attempted by an adversary when the expected payoff for attempting any other attack step
does not justify the risk of detection and the cost of attempting the attack step.
The same AEG is used to model every IDS approach studied: none, centralized, dedicated
and embedded. The IDS used in a particular simulation run is modeled as a global variable
[18]. The cost to attempt the attack step, the probability that an attack step will lead to a
successful outcome for an adversary, as well as the effect an outcome will have on the system,
may be adjusted based on the IDS approach being modeled. The following description of
23
the CreateBotnet attack will illustrate how this may be accomplished.
Each attack step contains detailed information about the probability of success, prob-
ability of detection, cost to attempt, effect on the system, duration, and other informa-
tion. We present one attack step as an example, the CreateBotnet attack, which is Attack
Step 8 in the diagram. It is defined to cost the adversary $1,000 to attempt if no IDS is
present in the system, and $5,000 otherwise. If attempted, the attack step takes 8 hours
to complete. If the attack is to be attempted, the Undetected goal state variable and the
BotnetShepherdSkill skill state variable must both contain a positive value, the NumCom-
promisedSmartMeters goal state variable must hold a value greater than or equal to 50,
and finally the adversary must not already possess the Botnet access. If these conditions
are not met, the attack step cannot be attempted. If the attack step is attempted, one
of three outcomes, FailureUndetected, FailureDetected, or Success, is randomly chosen
according to their probabilities of occurrence. The FailureUndetected outcome represents
the event in which the adversary attempts the attack and fails, but remains undetected.
It has no effect on the state of the model. The FailureDetected outcome represents the
event in which the adversary attempts the attack, fails, and is detected. If this outcome is
randomly selected by the simulation, it modifies the model state by changing the value of
the Undetected goal from 1 to 0, disabling any future attack, and depriving the adversary
of any reward he or she may otherwise have received for remaining undetected. Finally,
the Success outcome represents the successful completion of the attack. It has the effect of
giving the adversary access to a botnet of smart meters, which is represented by changing
the value of the BotnetAccess, State Variable Q, from 0 to 1. The probabilities of randomly
selecting the FailureUndetected, FailureDetected, and Success outcomes varies based on
the adversary’s level of expertise in the BotnetShepherdSkill and the type of IDS in the
system. The probability of selecting the FailureDetected outcome is set to 0.05. The prob-
ability of selecting the Success outcome is set to be 0.4 + 0.5 ·BotnetShepherdSkill, so the
adversary will be more likely to succeed if he or she is more skilled. The probability of the
FailureUndetected outcome is set to be 1− prob(FailureDetected)− prob(Success). As a
result, prob(Success) + prob(FailureDetected) + prob(FailureUndetected) = 1. However,
if an embedded IDS is installed in the system, the attack is less likely to succeed. In that
case, the probability of the Success outcome being chosen is scaled down, and the prob-
ability of the FailureDetected outcome is scaled up, in such a way that prob(Success) +
prob(FailureDetected) + prob(FailureUndetected) remains 1. All the other attack steps in
the model have a similar level of detail.
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BotnetAccess 1
LongRangeJammer
PhysicalAccess 1 1 1
RoutingCapability 1
ShortRangeJammer
CryptoKeys 1
TrafficKnowledge 1 1
BotnetShepherdSkill 7 6 10
ByzantineAttackSkill 2 8 5 10
NodeInstallationSkill 8 10 9 10
PhysicalSmartMeterExploitSkill 7 9 7 10
RemoteSmartMeterExploitSkill 7 7 10
RoutingAttackSkill 5 10 5 10
SmartMeterInstallationSkill 10 7 9
TrafficAnalysisSkill 3 9 5 10
CompromisedMeters 51
Table 4.3: Initial state values for each adversary. Skills are expressed in a range from 0 to
10.
4.2 Attacker Model
In addition to a model of attacks against the system, we need a model of the adversary, since
different adversaries have different goals, and different strengths and weaknesses. These
differences can lead to very different behaviors when the attackers are confronted by the
same system. Table 4.3 shows the state variables initially held by each adversary, which
describes their initial foothold in the system, their knowledge of system properties, and the
skills that will help them accomplish their attacks.
In ADVISE models an adversary has a specified preference for avoiding cost, avoiding
detection, and gaining payoff [14]. Different adversaries may weigh these preferences differ-
ently. For example, a well-funded nation-state may have substantial resources to launch an
attack but also a great desire to avoid detection. On the other hand, a terrorist may be
unable to afford an expensive attack but is very tolerant of the possibility of being detected
and caught. In previous ADVISE models adversary preferences were expressed by varying
the weights on the attack decision parameters [14]. For this case study, all adversaries weigh
cost and payoff equally, since we use the net-profit attractiveness function, as explained in
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Customer Insider Nation-State Terrorist
Undetected Goal $2000 $80000 $10000000 $0
CompromisedSmartMeters $0 $0 $0 $0
Steal Energy Goal $2000 $0 $0 $0
Interrupt Service Goal $0 $100 $10000 $10
Damage Equipment Goal $0 $1000 $20000 $100
Goal Achieved $0 $0 $0 $0
Table 4.4: The per-unit payoff assigned to each goal.
Chapter 3.
The adversary’s desire to avoid detection is expressed in the attack execution graph as a
goal, the Undetected goal. Every adversary initially holds this goal and if the adversary is
detected the adversary will not gain the payoff associated with this goal. If one adversary,
(call her Alice) has a higher payoff associated with the Undetected goal than another adver-
sary (call her Eve), it means that Alice has a higher preference for remaining undetected
than Eve. Unlike previous ADVISE models (e.g. the case studies in [14]), we choose to
model the preference to remain undetected as a goal in the AEG, in an effort to make the
adversary’s behavior easily understandable.
Table 4.4 gives the per-unit payoff assigned to each goal. The total payoff the adversary
receives at the end of the attack is the value of the goal times the per-unit payoff. For
example, if the malicious insider has a per-unit payoff of $100 for the Damage Equipment
goal, and the integer value of the goal at the end of the simulation is 7, the adversary receives
$100 · 7 = $700 of total payoff. For this reason, the adversaries are motivated to achieve as
high a value as possible for each goal to maximize payoff.
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Figure 4.2: Initial state of insider adversary. Elements with a bold outline denote state
variables initially held by the adversary.
4.2.1 State Variables Held by Insider
The insider adversary is assumed to be a disgruntled employee or former employee of the
utility company. The insider would have intimate familiarity with details of the inner work-
ings of the utility company, and many skills learned on the job. The insider adversary is
in some ways the most powerful adversary, because the insider starts with the most access,
knowledge, and skills of any adversary considered, and in addition is the only adversary
assumed to start with a number of compromised smart meters. See Table 4.3 and Figure
4.2 for a complete listing of state variables initially held by the adversary. This adversary
initially starts from a powerful position, but is constrained by a relatively high desire to
avoid detection, as can be seen in Table 4.4. The insider wishes to cause as much monetary
damage as possible to the utility company without being detected.
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Figure 4.3: Initial state of malicious customer adversary. Elements with a bold outline
denote state variables initially held by the adversary.
4.2.2 State Variables Held by Malicious Customer
The malicious customer adversary is assumed to be a customer of the utility company who
wishes to steal energy from the utility company by under-reporting energy usage. As can
be seen from Table 4.3, and from Figure 4.3, the malicious customer adversary is assumed
to have access to a physical smart meter (his or her own) and some skill in various attacks,
perhaps obtained via compromises published on the Internet. The customer wants to achieve
the goal of under-reporting electricity consumption to lower his or her bill. This unfairly
deprives the utility of compensation for providing power to the customer.
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Figure 4.4: Initial state of terrorist adversary. Elements with a bold outline denote state
variables initially held by the adversary.
4.2.3 State Variables Held by Terrorist
The terrorist adversary represents an individual or group that wishes to damage the equip-
ment of the utility company and cause a service disruption, perhaps to draw publicity to
a cause or as a demonstration of power. The terrorist adversary has fewer initial forms of
access, knowledge, and skill than the insider, as can be seen in Table 4.3. Consulate Figure
4.4 for a visual representation of the state variables initially held by this adversary. Table
4.4 shows that the terrorist adversary has the goal of causing the utility company as much
monetary damage as possible by interrupting the delivery of power and damaging equip-
ment. The terrorist is assumed to be unconcerned with the possibility of being detected and
apprehended, unlike the insider. This means that the terrorist is much more likely to try
risky attacks than the insider. This relatively high tolerance for the possibility of detection
is expressed in the model by letting the Undetected goal have a payoff of zero.
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Figure 4.5: Initial state of nation-state adversary. Elements with a bold outline denote
state variables initially held by the adversary.
4.2.4 State Variables Held by Nation-State
Finally, the nation-state adversary models a sophisticated, well-funded, malicious, but phys-
ically distant state actor that may wish to attack the utility to damage equipment and cause
major service disruptions during a conflict. In this model, the nation-state adversary has no
initial forms of access into the system. In particular, this adversary does not have physical
access to the system, which is a necessary prerequisite for several attack steps. However,
this adversary does start with all of the available skills in the AEG, plus knowledge of how
traffic is routed. A visual representation of the initial state of the nation-state adversary
may be found in Figure 4.5. As can be seen in Table 4.4, the nation-state adversary wishes
to damage the utility’s equipment and interrupt service, and is strongly motivated to remain
undetected.
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4.3 Metrics
We use the ADVISE model described above to calculate a number of useful metrics and
forecast the adversary’s behavior. All results are determined through the creation of per-
formance variables [27] calculated by simulation in Mo¨bius. We took the cross-product of
the adversaries {Insider, Customer, Nation State, Terrorist} and the IDS approaches {None,
Central, Dedicated, Embedded}, and ran a simulation for every element of this set. We
estimated the mean of every performance variable with a 0.95 confidence level and each was
run until a 10% relative width for the interval was reached.
The first result we consider is the attack path taken by the adversary through the AEG
during the course of the simulation. We determined this result by constructing a set of
interval-of-time impulse-reward variables, one reward variable for every attack step in the
AEG. If any outcome of a particular attack step is selected during the course of the simu-
lation the performance variable associated with that attack step accumulates a reward. By
examining this set of metrics it becomes possible to determine precisely which attacks an
adversary attempted during the course of the simulation. This information allows the mod-
eler to determine the paths taken by the adversary through the attack execution graph. The
modeler may use this metric to determine commonly exploited weaknesses in the system. A
system designer may use this insight to help place defenses in positions where they will do
the most good.
The next result, the cost for the adversary to attempt the attack, was also constructed as
a set of interval-of-time impulse-reward variables. Any time an outcome of an attack step
was attempted between the beginning and end of the simulation run, the cost to attempt
that attack step was added to a running total of the accumulated cost. This metric helps
a security analyst to determine whether different design decisions result in a system that
requires more or less effort for an adversary to successfully attack.
The third metric, the probability that the adversary will remain undetected through the
end of the attack, was constructed as an instant-of-time rate-reward variable that returned
the value of the Undetected goal variable at the end of the simulation. At the beginning of
the simulation, the Undetected goal variable holds a value of one. Almost every attack step
in the AEG has an outcome that represents the event that the adversary is detected if it is
executed. If that outcome occurs at some point during the course of the simulation, one of
its effects is to set the value of the Undetected goal variable to 0. If no outcome representing
the detection of the adversary is chosen during the course of the simulation, the value of
the Undetected goal variable remains 1. In that way we determine whether the adversary
was detected during one run of the simulation. Multiple runs of the simulation show the
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probability that the adversary will remain undetected through the duration of the attack.
The final and perhaps most important metric, the expected monetary loss incurred by the
utility in the event of an attack by an adversary, was also calculated by an instant-of-time
rate-reward variable. The integer values held in the StealElectricity, InterruptService, and
DamageEquipment goal state variables represent units of damage done by the adversary. We
let one unit of StealElectricity equal $600 of loss, one unit of InterruptService equal $10,000
of loss, and one unit of DamageEquipment equal $100,000 of loss. Initially these goal state
variables hold a value of 0, but the value can be increased at the successful conclusion
of certain attacks. The metric will help an analyst determine the relative benefits of the
various intrusion detection systems, by forecasting how much damage the utility sustains
when monitored by each IDS deployment configuration.
These results give a security analyst a broad view of the performance of the system under
attack and the likely adversary behavior. These quantitative metrics are auditable and
reproducible, and help analysts approach the problem of planning and forecasting security
consequences in a scientific manner.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
The ADVISE model, which we described in Chapter 4, may be executed to calculate a
number of security-focused metrics and gain insight into the adversary’s behavior. In this
chapter, we describe the results we obtained from executing the ADVISE model. We shall
first describe the results we obtained from executing the ADVISE security model, and then
we shall discuss a sensitivity analysis we conducted.
5.1 Model Execution Results
We executed the ADVISE model to generate four results: the sequence of attack steps the
adversary takes to achieve his or her goals, the cost the adversary incurs for attempting an
attack on the system; the probability that the utility company will detect the attack; and
finally, and perhaps most importantly, the expected monetary loss the utility sustains that
occurs due to the activity of the adversary. We shall examine each of these results in turn.
5.1.1 Adversary Attack Path
We shall first examine the sequence of attack steps each adversary (insider, malicious cus-
tomer, nation-state, and terrorist) uses given each IDS configuration (none, centralized,
dedicated, and embedded), as calculated by our simulation in Mo¨bius.
To begin, we shall consider the case in which the utility is not defended by any intrusion
detection system, as shown in Figure 5.1. When no IDS is present, the insider will imme-
diately attempt a major routing attack to cause massive damage and service disruptions.
They can attempt this attack since they initially start with the skill and access necessary to
attempt this attack. The malicious customer uses a longer sequence of attacks to achieve his
or her goal. The customer first attempts to install a short range jammer. Once this is ac-
complished, the customer may use their access to this jammer to try a short range jamming
attack to achieve the goal of stealing electricity by underreporting electricity consumption.
33
The nation-state has the longest attack path of any adversary we consider. As a first step,
the nation-state attempts a remote meter compromise to gain control of a number of smart
meters, and then tries to extract the cryptographic keys. Once this has been accomplished,
the nation-state will gain the ability to route traffic at will in the AMI, and will use this
ability to attempt a major routing attack. If the attack is successful, the nation-state will
damage the utility’s equipment and ability to deliver power. Finally, the terrorist will use
his or her physical access to the system to attempt a massively damaging physical attack,
which, if successful, results in damage to the system and interrupts service.
Next, we show the attack paths that are used by the various adversaries when confronted
by a centralized intrusion detection system, as shown in Figure 5.2. When compared to
Figure 5.1, we see that every adversary uses the same attack path, whether they face a
system guarded by no IDS or a centralized IDS, with one exception. The risk of detection
outweighs the potential benefits for the malicious customer if a centralized IDS is present,
so the malicious customer does not attempt any attack at all in this case. All of the other
adversaries use the same attack path as they would if faced by no IDS. However, as we shall
see later in the chapter, the centralized IDS puts an additional burden on the adversaries
and, in some cases, prevents them from doing as much damage to the system, or requires
more effort on the part of the adversary to achieve the same amount of damage.
Finally, we present the results of the attack paths chosen by the adversaries if a dedicated
IDS or an embedded IDS is used in the system. The attack paths are shown in Figure
5.3 and Figure 5.4. In this case, no adversary attempts to attack the system, except the
terrorist. The high probability of detection and the low probability of success discourages
most adversaries from even attempting an attack. Unlike other adversaries, the terrorist is
not penalized for being detected, and the intrusion detection systems do not have any effect
on the probability of success for the physical attack (since they are used to detect cyber
attacks), so the terrorist continues to attack despite the presence of the powerful intrusion
detection systems.
A modeler may use these attack path results as a guide when considering the placement
of system defenses. For example, given the model results, if the utility company chooses to
use the centralized intrusion detection system, it should also consider additional measures
to make it more difficult for a malicious nation-state to compromise meters remotely.
It would be useful to complement these results with metrics that estimate the cost the
adversary incurs for attempting an attack, and the probability that the adversary is detected
during the course of the attack. For example, an adversary may attempt the same attack path
given a different system configuration, but have a different cost or probability of completing
the attack undetected. These metrics give deeper insight into the security properties of the
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Figure 5.1: Adversary paths through the Attack Execution Graph if the utility company
does not use an IDS. If the adversary did not attempt an attack, no path is shown for that
adversary.
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Figure 5.2: Adversary paths through the Attack Execution Graph if the utility company
uses a centralized IDS. If the adversary did not attempt an attack, no path is shown for
that adversary. Note that for this IDS configuration the malicious customer adversary does
not attempt an attack.
36
Figure 5.3: Adversary paths through the Attack Execution Graph if the utility company
uses a dedicated IDS. If the adversary did not attempt an attack, no path is shown for that
adversary. Note that for this IDS configuration only the terrorist adversary attempts an
attack.
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Figure 5.4: Adversary paths through the Attack Execution Graph if the utility company
uses an embedded IDS. If the adversary did not attempt an attack, no path is shown for
that adversary. Note that for this IDS configuration only the terrorist adversary attempts
an attack.
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system, and we consider them next.
5.1.2 Cost to Adversary
It often costs an adversary resources to launch an attack, and we seek to estimate the expense
to the adversary given each intrusion detection system configuration we consider. This will
give deeper insight into the effectiveness of the intrusion detection system. The monetary
value of the resources expended by each adversary when faced by each intrusion detection
system, which we obtained by executing the ADVISE model, is given in Table 5.1.
The insider adversary spends about $15,000 when faced by no IDS, about $14,000 when
faced by a centralized IDS, and nothing when faced by a dedicated IDS or an embedded
IDS. The insider spends slightly more when there is no IDS than when there is a centralized
IDS because he or she will be more aggressive in attacking a nearly-defenseless system, and
attack more frequently, which costs more. The insider spends nothing when confronted by
a dedicated IDS or an embedded IDS because he or she will not attack at all in those cases.
When the utility does not utilize an intrusion detection system, the malicious customer
adversary spends about $200 on average to attempt an attack. When an intrusion detection
system is present in the system, the customer will not attempt any attack at all, and thus
incur no costs.
The nation-state will spend about $10,000 on average if the utility does not install an
intrusion detection system. However, the average cost quadruples if the nation-state must
attempt to defeat a centralized intrusion detection system. This shows that centralized IDS
may be useful for deterring some nation-state adversaries. The dedicated and embedded in-
trusion detection systems discourage the nation-state adversary from attempting any attack
and thus the nation-state does not incur the costs associated with the attack.
Finally, the average cost to the terrorist to attempt an attack does not vary at all based
on the intrusion detection system. For each of the IDS configurations, the adversary will
spend about $1,000 to attack the utility. In this model, the IDS does not make it more or
less difficult to attempt a physical attack, as an IDS is meant to prevent cyber attacks, so
the terrorist will not deviate from attempting this attack regardless of the IDS approach
chosen.
5.1.3 Probability Adversary Remains Undetected Through Attack
One useful measure of the effectiveness of an intrusion detection system is the probability
that it will successfully detect an adversary. We calculated these metrics using the ADVISE
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IDS Adversary Cost Error
Insider $15.3K +/- $330
None Customer $200 +/- $0.01
Nation-State $9.35K +/- $55
Terrorist $1K +/- $0
Insider $13.6K +/- $217
Centralized Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $39K +/- $105
Terrorist $1K +/- $0
Insider $0 * +/- $0
Dedicated Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $0 * +/- $0
Terrorist $1K +/- $0
Insider $0 * +/- $0
Embedded Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $0 * +/- $0
Terrorist $1K +/- $0
Table 5.1: Cost incurred by the adversary, given a particular IDS. Costs of 0 with asterisks
(*) occur as a result of the adversary choosing not to attack.
model we implemented in Mo¨bius, and present them in Table 5.2.
We first calculated a baseline: the probability of detecting each adversary if no intrusion
detection system is present in the system. The customer is quite likely to remain undetected
if no IDS is present in the system, while the other adversaries have a lower probability of
remaining undetected since the attacks they are attempting are risky and complicated. When
faced by a centralized intrusion detection system and compared to the baseline, the insider
has a slightly lower chance of being detected, because the insider acts more aggressively
and attacks more frequently when no IDS is present. When compared to the baseline, all
the other adversaries have the same chance of being detected or do not choose to attack
when faced by a centralized IDS. When faced by a dedicated IDS or an embedded IDS,
no adversary (with the exception of the terrorist) attempts any attack and thus has no
probability of being detected. The probability of detection does not change for the terrorist,
regardless of the intrusion detection system used, because the terrorist always attempts a
physical attack which is not affected by intrusion detection systems.
These results initially appear nonintuitive (because no IDS seems to increase the likelihood
of detecting the adversary) but can be easily explained. The intrusion detection system
can be so effective that the adversary will not even attempt an attack, because the risk
of detection does not outweigh the potential reward. When this happens, the adversary
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IDS Adversary Probability Error
Insider 0.382 +/- 0.021
None Customer 0.947 +/- 0.005
Nation-State 0.641 +/- 0.009
Terrorist 0.200 +/- 0.012
Insider 0.401 +/- 0.015
Centralized Customer 1 * +/- 0
Nation-State 0.632 +/- 0.009
Terrorist 0.200 +/- 0.012
Insider 1 * +/- 0
Dedicated Customer 1 * +/- 0
Nation-State 1 * +/- 0
Terrorist 0.200 +/- 0.012
Insider 1 * +/- 0
Embedded Customer 1 * +/- 0
Nation-State 1 * +/- 0
Terrorist 0.200 +/- 0.012
Table 5.2: The probability that the adversary will remain undetected by the end of the
attack. Results with asterisks (*) denote that the adversary went undetected because they
did not attempt to attack the system.
does not attack and remains undetected. If the adversary had attempted the attack, the
probability of detecting the adversary would have risen dramatically.
5.1.4 Expected Cost to Utility
The monetary loss that each adversary inflicts on a utility given each intrusion detection sys-
tem is one of the most important metrics for successfully completing a cost-benefit analysis.
The monetary loss includes the loss of equipment, service disruptions, and loss of revenue
due to energy theft. The results we obtained from the execution of our ADVISE model may
be found in Table 5.3.
We see that adversaries cause a great deal of damage when no intrusion detection system
is present in the AMI. Every adversary, except the terrorist, is predicted to do much less
damage when the centralized IDS is utilized in the AMI, and no damage when the dedicated
IDS or embedded IDS are used. The terrorist does the same amount of damage, regardless
of the intrusion detection system configuration used, because the terrorist favors physical
attacks, which the intrusion detection system cannot detect.
A utility company can use these metrics to compare intrusion detection approaches. The
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IDS Adversary Monetary Damage Error
Insider $11.6M +/- $312K
None Customer $379 +/- $1.84
Nation-State $6.3M +/- $60K
Terrorist $1.02M +/- $93K
Insider $2.9M +/- $54K
Centralized Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $1.58M +/- $16K
Terrorist $1.02M +/- $93K
Insider $0 * +/- $0
Dedicated Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $0 * +/- $0
Terrorist $1.02M +/- $93K
Insider $0 * +/- $0
Embedded Customer $0 * +/- $0
Nation-State $0 * +/- $0
Terrorist $1.02M +/- $93K
Table 5.3: Cost incurred by the utility company as a result of the actions of each adversary,
given a particular IDS. Results with asterisks (*) denote that the adversary did no damage
because they did not attempt to attack the system.
expected monetary loss sustained by a utility company, M , for an IDS configuration, i ∈
IDS, can be calculated with Equation 5.1
Mi =
∑
a
Na ∗Da (5.1)
where N is the expected number of attack attempts and Da is the expected monetary
damage to the system, D, per adversary, a ∈ Adversaries.
Consider a hypothetical utility that estimates 1,000 attack attempts by unscrupulous
customers, 5 attack attempts by an insider, 5 attack attempts by a nation-state, and 2
attack attempts by a terrorist over a 20-year period.
Using Equation 5.1 and the numbers in Table 5.3, we calculate the results shown in Table
5.4. The utility can use Table 5.4, along with information about installation and maintenance
costs provided by vendors, to help determine the most cost-effective architecture for its
system.
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IDS Approach Monetary Loss
None $91,919,000
Centralized $16,540,000
Dedicated $2,040,000
Embedded $2,040,000
Table 5.4: Estimated monetary loss by IDS approach over a 20-year period.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Models built using the ADVISE formalism utilize many input parameters. It may be difficult
to obtain accurate estimates for some of these input parameters. For example, it may be next
to impossible to precisely determine the payoff an adversary may achieve for accomplishing a
goal, or the costs to attempt certain attack steps, or the effectiveness of an intrusion detection
system which has not yet been implemented. The metrics that interest the security analyst
may be sensitive or insensitive to the input parameters. If the metric is insensitive to the
input parameter, it suggests that the security analyst need not be concerned with obtaining
an accurate estimate for it. If, on the other hand, the metric of interest is sensitive to the
input parameter, the modeler may have to accept uncertainty regarding the results. We
present such a sensitivity analysis to explore the stability of the model we develop in this
case study.
5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis Methodology
We use two different techniques in the sensitivity analysis: one that analyzes individual pa-
rameters one at a time at high resolution, and one that analyzes combinations of parameters
at a lower resolution.
Parameters Studied in Isolation: To begin, we analyze the various cost, payoff, and
effectiveness of IDS parameters individually, one at a time. This gives a detailed, low-level
view of the model parameters in isolation.
To begin, we define 10 cost scaling factors. Each of these factors scales a cost on an
individual attack step, except one factor which scales the cost on two attack steps. The
correspondence between cost scaling factors and attack steps is shown in Table 5.5. We do
6 simulations for each cost scaling factor, assigning it to each of the following values in turn:
0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, and 5.0. This, in turn, scales the original cost of the attack step by the
corresponding amount. We can then estimate the overall monetary damage incurred by the
utility given the scaled cost of the attack step. This allows us to analyze whether an attack
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would do more damage if the attack were cheaper, or less damage if the attack was more
expensive. For example, if we examine Table 5.7, we see that the insider adversary causes
the same amount of loss of availability and integrity when costScaleFactor 15 (the cost scale
factor for the Major Routing attack) is set to a value of 0.2 as it does when it is set to the
default value of 1.0. However, the insider does about a tenth as much damage if it is set to
5.0 as opposed to 1.0. This result can be interpreted to mean that the insider will do no
more damage if the Major Routing Attack is substantially cheaper, but will do much less
damage if it is substantially more expensive.
Next, we define 5 payoff scaling factors. Each of these factors scales the payoff an adversary
obtains for achieving a particular goal. Table 5.6 shows the goal that each payoff factor scales.
We vary each payoff scaling factor by assigning it to each of the following values in turn:
0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, and 5.0. This allows us to examine how much the motivation of an
adversary changes given different payoff values.
Finally, we let the IDSMultiplier, which scales the effectiveness of the intrusion detection
system, take one of six different values: 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.25. The IDS-
Multiplier has an effect on the probability of success and failure for various attack steps.
Often, the effect is to simply multiply the probability of success by the IDSMultiplier and
adjust the probability of failure in a corresponding way (so that the sum of the probabilities
total to 1), though sometimes the IDSMultiplier is used in a slightly more complicated way.
Since it scales the probability of success for the adversary on an attack step, a lower value
for the IDSMultiplier is better for the defender.
Each time a scaling factor was varied, whether it was associated with cost, payoff, or the
IDSMultiplier, an experiment was run 16 times, one for each of the cross-product of the
adversaries and the IDSes. There were 10 cost scaling factors, 5 payoff scaling factors, and 1
IDSMultiplier scaling factor, for a total of 16 scaling factors. Each of the 16 scaling factors
was assigned to one of six values in turn. Therefore, a total of 16 ∗ 16 ∗ 6 = 1536 experiment
runs were conducted for this phase of the sensitivity analysis.
Parameters Studied in Combination: Next, we analyze the consequences of varying
the cost, payoff and effectiveness of IDS parameters in combination.
First, we define a cost scaling factor, CostScaleFactor. This scaling factor scales each
attack cost (and the Undetected goal payoff value) at the same time. We have defined the
Undetected goal payoff as a cost, rather than a payoff, because the adversary always begins
with the payoff from this goal, and can only maintain or lose it, but never increase it. By an
equivalent definition, the CostScaleFactor is the union of all the cost scale factors in Table
5.5 and the payoffScaleFactor1 defined in Table 5.6. As the cost scaling factor grows larger
the cost for the adversary to perform any chain of actions increases (or remains the same, in
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Scale Factor Name Corresponding Attack Step(s)
costScaleFactor1 Install Long Range Jammer
Install Short Range Jammer
costScaleFactor3 Install Malicious Smart Meter
costScaleFactor4 Physical Smart Meter Exploit
costScaleFactor5 Mass Meter Compromise
costScaleFactor6 Remote Smart Meter Exploit
costScaleFactor8 Create Botnet
costScaleFactor13 Physical Attack
costScaleFactor15 Major Routing Attack
costScaleFactor16 Byzantine Attack
Table 5.5: The scaling factors in the left column scale the costs of the attack steps in the
right column.
Scale Factor Name Corresponding Goal
payoffScaleFactor1 Undetected Goal
payoffScaleFactor2 Compromised Smart Meters Goal
payoffScaleFactor3 Steal Energy Goal
payoffScaleFactor4 Interrupt Service Goal
payoffScaleFactor5 Damage Equipment Goal
Table 5.6: The scaling factors in the left column scale the payoffs of the goals in the right
column.
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the case of attacks that have no cost). We vary the CostScaleFactor in 10 increments of 0.2
between 0.2 and 2.0.
Similarly, we define a payoff scaling factor, PayoffScaleFactor. This scaling factor scales
the payoff for each goal at the same time, with the exception of the Undetected goal. We
may define the PayoffScaleFactor as the union of all the payoff scale factors (except payoff-
ScaleFactor1 ) in Table 5.6. A larger value for the PayoffScaleFactor will result in a greater
adversary payoff for achieving one or more goals, while a smaller value for the PayoffScale-
Factor will result in a smaller adversary payoff for achieving one or more goals, except, of
course, for the case when goals have a payoff of zero. We vary the PayoffScaleFactor in
increments of 0.2 between 0.2 and 2.0, just as we did for the CostScaleFactor.
Lastly, we used the IDSMultiplier we defined previously. This scale factor is allowed to
take one of the following four values: 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 and 0.2.
5.2.2 Insider
The first adversary we consider is the insider. After examining Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 it
becomes clear that this adversary’s effect on the system is most sensitive to scale factors
costScaleFactor15, payoffScaleFactor1, and payoffScaleFactor5. These factors scale the cost
of performing the Major Routing Attack, the payoff of the Undetected goal, and the payoff
of the DamageEquipment goal, respectively. Scaling the other cost, payoff and detection
factors according to the scheme we proposed in our methodology did not affect the total
monetary loss sustained by the utility.
These results are intuitive. The insider already has a strong foothold in the system, as can
be seen in Table 4.3, and so is uninterested in attempting attacks that would increase his
or her knowledge of or access to the AMI network. In addition, the insider is not interested
in any attack performed with goal of stealing electricity. Therefore, it is reasonable that
the insider is insensitive to most of the individual attack costs. Furthermore, as shown
in Table 4.4, the adversary is not interested in stealing electricity or compromising smart
meters, and receives a relatively low payoff for compromising the availability of the AMI.
This explains why varying the factors that scale the corresponding payoffs has no discernible
effect on the model. The insider’s effect on the system is most sensitive to the scale factors
corresponding to the two goals with the highest payoffs, and the attack which the adversary
uses to maximize payoff.
If we examine Figure 5.5, we see that the insider will cause the same amount of loss to the
utility, when there is no IDS present, for almost every combination of the payoff scale factor
and cost scale factor. For this system configuration, the insider will cause no damage to the
46
system only when the payoff is set very low and the cost is high. In every other cost/payoff
combination, the insider will do massive damage to the system. We see more variability in
Figure 5.6, which displays the monetary damage done by the insider when a centralized IDS
is present in the AMI. However, a clear majority of cost/payoff scale factor combinations
give results identical to the default cost/payoff scale factor combination. This gives some
confidence that this configuration of the model may tolerate small to moderate errors in the
estimates of the insider’s payoffs and costs. In contrast, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show that the
distributed and embedded configurations are quite sensitive to changes to the estimates of
the insider’s payoffs and costs. For example, keeping the payoff scale factor set to its default
value of 1.0 and reducing the cost scale factor to 0.8 results in around $1,000,000 in damage,
compared to $0 in damage when both factors are set to their default values of 1.0.
The results of this sensitivity analysis may help a utility make more effective and informed
design and policy choices. The sensitivity analysis suggests that the utility company should
focus on (a) decreasing the payoff an insider may receive from performing an attack by
monitoring and improving employee job satisfaction, and (b) increasing the penalty an insider
incurs when caught performing the attack. In addition, the sensitivity analysis warns that
the utility should take care to not overestimate the effectiveness of the distributed and
embedded intrusion detection systems, since small increases in the adversary’s payoff or
small decreases in the adversary’s cost may be enough to motivate the adversary to attempt
massively damaging attacks. The utility’s modelers should be aware that small errors in their
estimates of these values may cause drastic differences in the results given in the model.
Figure 5.5: Monetary damage done by
the insider adversary and no IDS.
Figure 5.6: Monetary damage done by
the insider adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = {0.001,0.01,0.1,0.2} and
centralized IDS.
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Variable IDS Type 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.0
None 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
costScaleFactors Centralized 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038
1,3,4,5,6,8,9,13, Distributed 0 0 0 0 0 0
and 16 Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
costScaleFactor 15 Centralized 3038 3038 3038 2996 2414 229
Distributed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
payoffScaleFactor 1 Centralized 3038 3038 3038 3038 2996 0
Distributed 1051 1019 0 0 0 0
Embedded 1051 1019 0 0 0 0
None 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
payoffScaleFactors Centralized 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038
2,3, and 4 Distributed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600
payoffScaleFactor 5 Centralized 229 1848 3038 3038 3038 3038
Distributed 0 0 0 1019 1019 1051
Embedded 0 0 0 1019 1019 1051
Table 5.7: Cost incurred by the utility company due to an insider attack, for each scaling
factor value. Values are in thousands of dollars.
Variable IDS Type 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25
Centralized 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038 3038
IDSMultiplier Distributed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.8: Cost incurred by the utility company due to an insider attack, for each scaling
factor value. Values are in thousands of dollars.
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Figure 5.7: Monetary damage done by
the insider adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = {0.001,0.01,0.1,0.2} and
dedicated IDS.
Figure 5.8: Monetary damage done by
the insider with
ScaleFactorIDS = {0.001,0.01,0.1,0.2} and
embedded IDS.
5.2.3 Malicious Customer
We turn to an analysis of the criminal customer, who wishes to steal electricity (as defined
in Table 4.4). The adversary has access to smart meters, but is not particularly skilled in
attacks or knowledgeable about the system in general (as shown in Table 4.3).
We begin with an analysis of the various individual cost, payoff and detection scaling
factors. To begin, we can see from Table 5.9 that the adversary’s effect on the system is
not sensitive to any of the individual cost scaling factors, nor is it sensitive to the factors
which scale the payoff of the CompromiseSmartMeter goal, the DamageEquipment goal, or
the InterruptService goal. The customer obtains no payoff for compromising smart meters,
damaging equipment, or interrupting service, so we would expect that varying the corre-
sponding scaling factors would have no effect on the model. It is more surprising that the
adversary’s effect on the system is so insensitive to cost, but the costs of the attacks are
small compared to the payoff of either stealing electricity or remaining undetected, which
explains the result.
Continuing the analysis of Table 5.9, along with Table 5.10, the malicious customer causes
more damage to the AMI with a centralized IDS than he or she otherwise would have if
the payoff for the Undetected goal is half or less of its original value. This means that if
the penalty for getting caught is lessened the customer is tempted to try the attack on the
centralized IDS. The customer also causes more damage to the AMI with a centralized IDS
if the payoff of the StealEnergy goal is increased, or if the centralized IDS is assumed to be
very weak. However, when confronted by the dedicated or embedded IDS, the customer will
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not attempt an attack even if the penalty for getting caught is very low, or the payoff for
stealing electricity is very high, or the IDS is assumed to be relatively ineffective.
We next consider the aggregated payoff, aggregated cost, and detection scale factors. If
we examine Figure 5.9, we see that if there is no intrusion detection system the malicious
customer will be motivated to attempt the attack and succeeds in stealing electricity except
in the cases when the payoff is quite low and at the same time the cost is relatively high. In
contrast, Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show that small changes to the overall cost or payoff estimates
can have drastic effects on the output of the model. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show that the
estimate monetary loss for the utility given the dedicated and embedded IDS deployment
approaches is not sensitive to changes in estimates of the adversary costs and payoffs.
The utility should carefully review the information contained in this sensitivity analysis.
The model of the centralized approach is very sensitive to small decreases in cost and increases
in payoff for the malicious customer adversary. The initial results presented in the previous
section suggested that the centralized IDS would stop all attack attempts by the malicious
customer adversary, but this sensitivity analysis suggests that this may not be the case,
unless the payoff and cost estimates are very accurate. If more accurate estimates are not
available, a conservative approach would suggest that the utility should either assume that
at least some percentage of malicious customers will successfully reach the goal. This may
lead the utility to consider more effective intrusion detection approaches.
Figure 5.9: Monetary damage done by the
malicious customer adversary and no IDS.
50
Variable IDS Type 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.0
None 301 301 301 301 301 301
costScaleFactors Centralized 0 0 0 0 0 0
1,3,4,5,6,8,9,13, Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 and 16 Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 301 301 301 301 301 301
payoffScaleFactor 1 Centralized 167 167 0 0 0 0
Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 301 301 301 301 301 301
payoffScaleFactors Centralized 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,4, and 5 Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 0 301 301 301 301 301
payoffScaleFactor 3 Centralized 0 0 0 167 167 167
Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.9: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a malicious customer attack, for
each scaling factor value. Values are in dollars.
Variable IDS Type 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25
Centralized 0 0 0 0 0 221
IDSMultiplier Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.10: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a malicious customer attack, for
each scaling factor value. Values are in dollars.
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Figure 5.10: Monetary damage done by the
malicious customer adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = {0.001,0.01,0.1} and
centralized IDS.
Figure 5.11: Monetary damage done by the
malicious customer adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = 0.2 and centralized IDS.
Figure 5.12: Monetary damage done by the
malicious customer adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = {0.001,0.01,0.1} and
IDS={dedicated, embedded}.
Figure 5.13: Monetary damage done by the
malicious customer adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS = 0.2 and
IDS = {dedicated, embedded}.
5.2.4 Nation-State
The nation-state adversary wishes to damage equipment and interrupt service at the utility,
but pays a high cost if detected (this is shown in Table 4.4). The adversary is highly skilled
in various attacks and fairly knowledgeable about the system, but has minimal access (as
can be seen in Table 4.3).
We first consider the individual scale factors. Examining Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 we
see that the adversary’s effect on the system only changes when the cost scaling factor
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associated with the Remote Smart Meter Compromise attack is varied, or when the payoff
scaling factor that scales the payoff of the Undetected goal is varied. This result is sensible:
the nation-state adversary is not nearly as constrained by cost as the other adversaries, since
it is well-resourced. They are slightly sensitive to the relatively large cost of doing a massive
remote smart meter compromise. The adversary is not very sensitive to attack step costs,
but the nation-state risks massive reputational damage, possible sanctions, and perhaps even
war if they are identified as an attacker. Therefore, their behavior is sensitive to changes in
the cost of being detected.
Next, we consider the aggregated cost, payoff and detection scale factors. Figure 5.14
shows us that the nation-state will always cause the same amount of damage irrespective
of any of the cost and payoff levels considered when faced with an AMI that employs no
IDS. Similarly, Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show that the adversary faced by the centralized IDS
will do massive damage almost irrespective of cost, payoff, or the IDS scale factor levels; the
only exceptions are cases when the payoff is very low and the cost is very high, and in these
cases the adversary does no damage. Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show that nation-state adversary
will do no damage to the system when confronted by a dedicated or embedded IDS for any
combination of cost, payoff, or IDS detection level considered, with one exception. The
one exception is when the payoff is set to double its normal value, the cost is a fifth of its
normal value, and the IDS multiplier is set to its weakest level, in which case the adversary
is motivated to attack and causes a small amount of damage.
The modeler may use these results to inform their design decisions. The most immediately
apparent result is the critical importance of preventing the smart meters from being remotely
compromised en masse. Both the embedded and dedicated intrusion detection systems seem
to offer the defender a very good way to accomplish this goal. Even the centralized intru-
sion detection system offers some improvement over no intrusion detection system in this
respect. The sensitivity analysis also makes clear that the adversary’s estimated impact on
the system is relatively insensitive to cost, payoff, and detection parameters. This may give
the modeler increased confidence that the model results accurately reflect reality even if the
input parameters were not estimated with high precision.
5.2.5 Terrorist
The terrorist adversary has the goal of damaging equipment and interrupting service, but is
not concerned with the possibility of being detected by the defender (these preferences may
be seen in Table 4.4). It becomes clear after examining Table 4.3 that the adversary is not
very highly skilled, and has limited knowledge of and access to the AMI.
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Variable IDS Type 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.0
None 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243
costScaleFactors Centralized 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601
1,3,4,5,8,9,13, Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
15, and 16 Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243
costScaleFactor 6 Centralized 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601 0
Dedicated 5 5 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243
payoffScaleFactor 1 Centralized 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601
Dedicated 0 0 0 0 5 5
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243 6243
payoffScaleFactors Centralized 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601 1601
2,3,4, and 5 Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.11: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a nation-state attack, for each
scaling factor value. Values are in thousands of dollars.
Variable IDS Type 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25
Centralized 1604 1604 1596 1601 1598 1621
IDSMultiplier Dedicated 0 0 0 0 0 0
Embedded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.12: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a nation-state attack, for each
scaling factor value. Differences in the result are within the confidence interval. Values are
in thousands of dollars.
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Figure 5.14: Monetary damage done by the
nation-state adversary and no IDS.
Figure 5.15: Monetary damage done by the
nation-state adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS={0.001,0.01,0.1}
and centralized IDS.
Figure 5.16: Monetary damage done by the
nation-state with ScaleFactorIDS=0.2
and centralized IDS.
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show that the behavior of this adversary is very sensitive to the
cost of the Physical attack and to the payoff of the Damage Equipment goal, but is very
insensitive to the other payoff, cost, and detection values. The data shows us that if the cost
of the Physical attack is increased or the payoff of the Damage Equipment goal is decreased
the adversary does no damage to the system. The terrorist does no harm to the system in
this case because it does nothing, since all the other actions have a negative expected payoff.
Figures 5.19 and 5.20 show that the terrorist is not very sensitive to the type or strength
of the intrusion detection system, but is quite sensitive to the aggregated costs and payoffs
relating to the attack. This result is not surprising, since the intrusion detection system does
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Figure 5.17: Monetary damage done by the
nation-state adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS={0.001,0.01,0.1} and
dedicated IDS.
Also represents damage done by the
nation-state adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS={0.001,0.01,0.1,0.2 } and
embedded IDS.
Figure 5.18: Monetary damage done by the
nation-state adversary with
ScaleFactorIDS=0.2 and dedicated IDS.
not change the efficacy of the physical attack, which the terrorist favors.
The utility may use the results of this sensitivity analysis to help make security investment
decisions. For example, the sensitivity analysis confirms that the different kinds of intrusion
detection systems have a low impact on the terrorist. If the utility is concerned with terrorist
attacks it would be reasonable for it to invest more money into things that would make
physical attack more difficult (such as fences, security cameras, physical patrols) rather than
investing in a powerful and expensive intrusion detection system. The sensitivity analysis
also shows that the degree to which the terrorist values the Damage Equipment goal has a
large effect on the model results, from the perspective of the defender. If the value of this
goal decreases slightly it will demotivate the terrorist so much that it will not even attempt
the attack, while a large increase in the value of the goal will barely effect the results. This
gives the modeler some confidence in the estimate for this goal value: if the estimate is just
slightly too high it is likely that the adversary won’t even try the attack, but if the estimate
if low (even grossly low) the adversary likely won’t do much more damage than they would
if the estimate were true.
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Variable IDS Type 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.0
None 1051 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
costScaleFactor 1 Centralized 1051 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Dedicated 1051 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Embedded 1051 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
None 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
costScaleFactors Centralized 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
3,4,5,6,8,9,15, and 16 Dedicated 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Embedded 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
None 1019 1019 1019 0 0 0
costScaleFactor 13 Centralized 1019 1019 1019 0 0 0
Dedicated 1019 1019 1019 0 0 0
Embedded 1019 1019 1019 0 0 0
None 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
payoffScaleFactors Centralized 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
1,2,3, and 4 Dedicated 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Embedded 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
None 0 0 1019 1019 1019 1051
payoffScaleFactor 5 Centralized 0 0 1019 1019 1019 1051
Dedicated 0 0 1019 1019 1019 1051
Embedded 0 0 1019 1019 1019 1051
Table 5.13: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a terrorist attack, for each scaling
factor value. Values are in thousands of dollars.
Variable IDS Type 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25
Centralized 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
IDSMultiplier Dedicated 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Embedded 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
Table 5.14: Cost incurred by the utility company due to a terrorist attack, for each scaling
factor value. Values are in thousands of dollars.
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Figure 5.19: Monetary damage done by the
terrorist and no IDS.
Figure 5.20: Monetary damage
done by the terrorist adversary
with ScaleFactorIDS=
{0.001,0.01,0.1,0.2}
and IDS =
{centralized, dedicated, embedded}.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we demonstrated that the ADVISE state-based stochastic modeling approach
may be used to calculate security metrics that are relevant in comparing different IDS de-
ployment configurations in an AMI network through the use of a case study. These security
metrics may be used by analysts to build more secure and defensible AMI deployments.
We argue that the scientific approach ADVISE offers for security evaluation is a useful
complement to a common method of estimating the relative effectiveness of different security
approaches: consultation of one or more security experts, who rely on intuition and experi-
ence. In contrast, the metrics calculated by ADVISE are easily auditable by other parties
and assumptions are explicitly stated, which allows multiple security experts with different
backgrounds to use the ADVISE formalism as a modeling language to collaboratively analyze
different system designs.
6.1 An Argument for Quantitative Security Metrics
Some are concerned that models that produces quantitative security metrics (like ADVISE)
may be misused to the detriment of the security of the system, in part because people
may place too much faith in the accuracy of the metrics [28]. However, we believe that
the alternative of having no formal security model is worse. Security analysts will almost
always form an informal mental model of the system, which are limited in many of the same
ways as a formal security model, while also suffering from its own set of limitations. The
ADVISE formalism gives a modeler the ability to convert this mental model into a formal,
concrete, rigorous, auditable model. The quantitative metrics produced by these models will
contribute towards the development of a science of security.
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6.2 Future Work
In the future, we plan to make the ADVISE formalism easier to use, and extend it to increase
the modeling power of the approach. First, we will explore an approach to convert a high-
level system diagram into an Attack Execution Graph, which will allow a modeler to quickly
and easily generate large, sophisticated security models. Then, we shall consider ways to
extend the ADVISE formalism so that a modeler may also analyze the defender behavior in
the system of interest, in addition to the adversary’s behavior, as well as the interactions
between the defender and the adversary.
6.2.1 Automatic Generation of AEG
Though many aspects of the ADVISE formalism are intuitive and easy to use, there is
room for improvement. It can be challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone to create
effective Attack Execution Graphs by hand, even for an expert in security and modeling.
Those without security or modeling background may have even greater difficulty learning
and using the ADVISE formalism. In the future, we would like to explore an approach for
automatically generating Attack Execution Graphs from high level system models.
Using this approach, a modeler would construct a graphical model of the system of interest.
The modeler would use elements taken from a preexisting system component library to build
the system model. The system component library would consist of system components and
the relationships that may be formed among the components. For example, a system model
may consist of networks, smart meters, intrusion detection systems, and the relationships
among them. Once the security analyst constructs the system model, it may be used by a
model generation algorithm to create an Attack Execution Graph. The model generation
algorithm would utilize a predefined ontology which would map elements in the system
component library to elements of an AEG.
To determine whether or not the approach is effective, we intend to create a custom system
component library and ontology for the AMI case study, and use a generation algorithm
similar to the one proposed in [29] to automatically convert a high-level system model into
an Attack Execution Graph. We would then compare the automatically-generated AEG with
the hand-generated AEG, to determine their similarity. If successful, this model generation
approach could dramatically reduce the time needed to create a functional ADVISE model.
60
6.2.2 Extending ADVISE
Currently, it is difficult to model the defender’s response to an adversary’s actions. In
this case study, the defender response is modeled implicitly in the Attack Execution Graph
through the use of global variables. This is not a good general approach, because it makes
it difficult to calculate some defender-specific metrics and specify some defender behaviors.
Several other ADVISE case studies [14] [30] use stochastic activity networks (SANs) [31] to
model the defender behavior in the system. In these case studies, the defender SAN mod-
els and the adversary ADVISE models are composed together to calculate relevant security
metrics. This approach is powerful and flexible, but difficult to use. It requires the modeler
to learn two formalisms (ADVISE and SANs), and SANs are a very general-purpose mod-
eling language and are not particularly well suited to create security models. We propose
extending the ADVISE formalism so it could natively support defender models in addition
to adversary models to overcome this limitation. The security models created using this
extended formalism would be a very powerful aid to security analysts who seek to make
good design choices when building or improving cyber systems.
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